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That the mos italicus progressively declined (though at different times in different places) is of course true. What is arguable is whether the advent of legal humanism entailed a scission among jurists between mos italicus and mos gallicus. What exactly this mos gallicus may be is not easy to say. We use this label to group together any heterodoxy in respect of the mos italicus, and we move from the draconian principle 'semel-semper'. If a writer does not behave as a Bartolist at any given time, his entire work must be considered part of legal humanism. 2 * I am particularly grateful to John W. Cairns and Paul du Plessis for their advice and scrupulous editing of the script. 1 The link between legal humanism and Elegant Jurisprudence tends to be less pronounced in most textbooks. This of course seems bizarre, but only at first sight. For Elegant Jurisprudence was yet another 'wrong' bending of the road leading towards the Modern Truth. 2 The opposite is of course also true: we can make sense of the later mos italicus as a unitary category only by sweeping generalisations. This has probably nurtured the Bartolists-Humanists divide nearly as much as the semel-semper principle. More deeply, it might have even contributed to its very creation. One of the most recent attempts to explain the interplay between mos italicus and mos gallicus speaks of 'numerous variants and gradations' of the 'humanist dimension', and labels the middle ground between As it is well known, the two main elements of legal humanism were history and philology. Legal humanism heralded, among other things, the birth of legal history in the modern sense of the term -namely, the study of the law (mostly Roman) from a historical perspective. But precisely because of this, it was hardly a turning point in legal history. The philological element could have entailed more profound repercussions, since it challenged the very foundations of the ius commune. By and large, however, the scope of those repercussions was such as to neutralise them. Strict adherence to ancient texts would have led to conclusions interesting for historians, but untenable for contemporary jurists. Legal history stemmed from legal humanism, but legal historians tend to be innocuous creatures in respect to the development of the law. Further, early legal humanists were often academics in the worst sense of the term, more inclined to quarrels than cooperation. The confusion and variety of different views on what the original text might have been was such that, rather than spreading a single voice, or a polyphonic harmony, it produced a loud cacophonic sound. Or at least this was what coeval jurists perceived. This contribution will focus on a small example of such legal humanists' 'voices' and of their reception among Bartolists, the case of iurisdictio. It does not aim at completeness in the least. It is most definitely not an essay on the development of the concept of iurisdictio in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and it lacks any pretence to guide the reader into the intricacies of the subject. 3 The scope is narrower and the purpose more modest: describing the position of some legal humanists on a specific subject, observing the reaction of non-humanist jurists and perhaps glimpsing the ultimate reasons behind their contrast. This is a significant caveat, for the focus of these pages is not on legal humanist theories, but on their immediate impact. Further, such an impact should not be assessed in general terms. The influence of legal humanism on the work of Bartolist lawyers was extremely variegated (to say nothing of the universe behind the terms 'non-humanist' and 'Bartolist'). Any general account would necessarily result in a broad narration with scant truth in it. Rather, I will focus on few humanist jurists, mostly of the first half of the sixteenth century, chosen mainly because of their frequent quotation by other non-humanist lawyers on the subject. Also, although the choice of the subject is arbitrary, I believe that the same results could be reached with a different subject. The important point is that the topic is abstract enough to attract legal humanists' attention but not entirely detached from reality, lest it would be ignored by non-humanist jurists. Iurisdictio simply fitted the bill. Lastly, although here we are on shakier ground, it offers another advantage, as its 'deconstruction' might betray some political intent. Two last points. The term 'iurisdictio' refers to the jurisdictional prerogatives of a judge, not to other subjects (e.g. territorial jurisdiction, state jurisdiction, etc.). Second, references to secondary sources are extremely limited. This is intentional. There are many modern excellent works touching on the subject, but very few devoted to it.
Bartolism and legal humanism as 'moderate humanism'. Beyond this threshold the Elegant Jurisprudence lies; behind it, we are still in the province of Bartolism. R. Lesaffer, European Legal History (trans. J. Arriens), Cambridge: University Press, 2009, p. 353-354. 3 For more exhaustive works on the subject see first of all the seminal study of M.P. Gilmore, Argument from Roman law in political thought, 1200-1600, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1941, esp. p. 77-85, and more recently the important contribution of L. Mannori, Per una 'preistoria' della funzione amministrativa. Cultura giuridica e attività dei pubblici apparati nell'età del tardo diritto comune, in Quaderni Fiorentini per la Storia del Pensiero Giuridico, 19 (1990) , p. 323-504, esp. p. 345-407. To some extent, despite the somewhat different perspective, the present paper is meant as a gloss on Mannori's remarkable study.
Several studies mention some of the issues related to our subject while looking at other subjects. Pointing at them might have risked shifting the focus of these pages.
ii. Early modern public law evolved rapidly. But it did not move away from its medieval framework. Rather, it built on it. The whole administrative structure of the early modern state was still rooted in the medieval concept of iurisdictio. In a paradox of history, the modern idea of iurisdictio is probably closer to the Roman than the medieval one. It is well known that the medieval concept of iurisdictio derives from the conflation of two distinct categories, iuris-dictio (to 'say' the law) and iuris-ditio (the 'power' of the law). 4 Of the two concepts, medieval jurists considered that of iuris-ditio to be the general one. As such, the general concept of iurisdictio did not have a jurisdictional meaning, but it simply meant 'authority'. 5 In turn, this general potestas was divided in two categories: jurisdictional power on the one hand, and any other power (we would say, both administrative and legislative functions) on the other. Jurisdictional power was termed 'iurisdicito simplex ', 6 while the other category 'imperium'. 7 Imperium was in turn separated into merum and mixtum. 8 The distinction was based on their different aim: imperium merum was concerned with public utility; when on the contrary the utility was mainly private, the imperium was mixtum.
9 Further, imperium -both merum and mixtum -and iurisdictio simplex were each fragmented into six levels, so that, for ' See further ibid., n. 7-13 and n. 14-22, p. 112-113, on merum and mixtum imperium respectively. 9 Ibid., n. 6. Cf. also ibid., n. 15, p. 113. instance, merum imperium ranged from the power to enact general laws to that of imposing a modest fine.
10
This complex system was based on two pillars. First, there was no clear-cut conceptual distinction between iurisdictio and imperium. They formed a single and unitary category in which jurisdictional prerogatives were but a part of a more general power of government.
11 Second, and crucially, the different kinds and degrees of jurisdiction were not to be distinguished according to the functions of the magistrate or the territorial extension of his jurisdiction, but rather according to the personal status of the iudex, 12 so that the first and foremost division was that between iudex nobilis and iudex mercenarius. 13 Unlike the iudex mercenarius, the iudex nobilis did not need a lawsuit to exercise his jurisdiction. Ultimately, the distinction between iurisdictio simplex and imperium did not lie in their specific characteristics, but in the status of the iudex who exercised them.
iii. Even from such a short survey it should be clear that the medieval understanding of iurisdictio was hardly faithful to the Roman sources. Unsurprisingly enough, the first jurist to insist on the point was Andreas Alciatus (Andrea Alciato, 1492-1550). In the second book of his Paradoxa, Alciatus methodically demolished the ius commune concept of iurisdictio. There is nothing in the sources to justify the idea of iurisdictio as a broad and all-encompassing genus. Merum imperium hardly designs a general, allencompassing power. The sources speak of 'merum' in the restrictive sense of 'solum' -and not 'absolute' and 'unbounded', as the Civilians would have it. When imperium is merum, it has no iurisdictio. Deprived of any jurisdictional prerogative, merum imperium is just the 'potestas animadvertendi in facinorosos homines' (D.2.1.3), that is, the power to inflict a punishment.
14 Since Ulpian speaks of a gladii potestas, this punishment must refer only to criminal proceedings. Clearly, it has nothing in common with the jurisdictional sphere -iurisdictio. 15 Not only, therefore, do extra-jurisdictional powers ('ditio') have hardly any similarity at all with iurisdictio, but they are not even included in merum imperium. Correctly understood, merum imperium is but a magistrate's prerogative, not the supreme power reserved to the prince alone. 16 In turn, the sources are quite clear in that mixtum imperium consists of bonorum possessio and of iudicis dandi licentia. 17 The entire distinction so dear to Civilians between iudex nobilis and mercenarius, and ultimately between public and private utility, is therefore completely groundless. 18 For instance, condemnation and absolution alike are principally aimed at public utility. But if merum imperium had the monopoly of all actions primarily inspired by public utility, then we should conclude that absolution would fall within merum imperium too. And this is not what the sources tell us. In short, the whole understanding of the Civilians, 'who followed Bartolus as a prince of the Legal Republic', 19 was seriously flawed. Alciatus' Paradoxa heralded the offensive. And yet his triumph was partial. Almost by default, among humanist jurists the pars destruens of an author's argument was considerably more successful than his pars construens. While most legal humanists agreed on what iurisdictio and imperium were not, 20 no such consensus was reached on what they actually were. The reconstruction proposed by Alciatus was successful mainly in its repudiation of the old scheme, but not in replacing it with a new one.
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Having duly deconstructed the Civilians' concept of iurisdictio, the problem was how to put its pieces together. Merum imperium was particularly problematic, and to some extent representative of the legal humanists' approach, as it triggered endless learned disputes. Humanist jurists proved considerably more apt at digging into the texts than building on them. The main points on which, by and large, many of them tended to 17 Ibid., lib. 2, ch. 8, fol. 17v. Space limits do not allow forays into the intricacies of the subject and most of all on the manifold interpretations of 'iudicis dandi licentia'. The issue of iurisdictio delegata gave rise to endless and very complex controversies on its meaning and -moreover -scope. Thankfully, however, such controversies did not create new interpretations of imperium but rather depended on it. We will return to the point in the conclusion. 18 Ibid., lib. 2, ch. 7, fol. 17v. 19 Ibid., 'quem, uti legalis reipublicae principem alii sequuntur'. 20 An obvious exception must be made for Ulrichus Zasius (Huldrych Zäsi, 1461-1536). On our subject, Zasius was a strict adherent to the Bartolian orthodoxy, the main addition being solely a more punctual reference to the textual sources than the average Civilian. Nowhere he detached himself from the Bartolian reading of jurisdiction (at the most reporting some variations proposed by Baldus). In his work both definitions and scope of iurisdictio, mixtum and merum imperium are perfectly adhering to the Bartolian lectura, together with the distinction between publica and privata utilitas and between iudex nobilis and mercenarius, as well as with delegata iurisdictio. Zasius' work on iurisdictio and imperium may be found in his comment to his Paradoxorum ad Pratum libri sex, cit., lib. 2, ch. 10-11, fols. 18r-19r. In particular, the least successful element of Alciatus' three-fold division was probably the explanation of mixtum imperium as persecutio, chiefly because leading to an autonomous category rather than to an intermediate one between iurisdictio and merum imperium. As it will become apparent in the next few pages, it was precisely the closeness between iurisdictio and mixtum imperium what attracted most humanist jurists (and so possibly made Alciatus' scheme less appealing). agree were two. First, as the modica coercio of mixtum imperium is instrumental to ius dicere, iurisdictio and mixtum imperium are deeply related, and hardly separable from each other. Second, merum imperium is fully separated from mixtum imperium and iurisdictio. And this was precisely the problem. Merum imperium is described in the sources as animadversio in facinorosos homines. Hence, most legal humanists considered it as the executio of the judgment in criminal cases. But if the executio is entrusted to the magistrate with merum imperium, and merum imperium is wholly detached from iurisdictio, it follows that such a magistrate may not have any cognitio of the subject matter. In short, the magistrate empowered to give execution to the judgment could not also hear the dispute, and vice versa.
This conclusion was already implicit in one of the first French legal humanists who followed Alciatus, Ioannis Longovallius (Jean Longueval). But Longovallius did not bring Alciatus' argument to its ultimate consequences. 22 The honour belongs to Ioannis Gillotus (Jean Gillot). 23 Gillotus sharply divided the legal proceeding in three phases: cognitio, sententia, and executio. As with Alciatus and Longovallius, and perhaps even more than either of them, in Gillotus mixtum imperium encompassed almost any judicial prerogative. 24 While cognitio and sententia pertain to iurisdictio and mixtum imperium, executio is the province of merum imperium. Executio is wholly detached from the legal proceeding because it is only concerned with executing the judgment ('sententiae effectus'). Once the decision is rendered, the controversy is over. This way, the magistrate with mixtum imperium enjoys full iurisdictio over the dispute while at the same time the distinction between mixtum and merum imperium is maintained.
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In Gillotus, the prerogatives of the ordinary (or delegated) judge were consistent with the sources and so surely correct. But the problem remained in respect to the magistrate with merum imperium: he would have to execute someone else's judgment without being able to look at it. Lacking any cognitio, he would resemble more an executioner than a magistrate. The problem was particularly thorny in case new evidence emerged after the jurisdictional phase. Gillotus sought to solve the problem by restricting the divide between merum and mixtum imperium. To this end he resorted to the old (Civilian) stratagem of dividing a legal category in a broad and general sense and a narrow and specific one. So, Gillotus argued, when specifically referred to criminal cases merum imperium is to be understood in its narrow meaning -merum as 'only': only imperium, without any iurisdictio. 26 In this sense, merum imperium is just potestas gladii. Its scope is restricted exclusively to animadvertere, which simply means chastisement ('punitionem ipsam significat'). 27 As such, in criminal trials merum 22 Ioannis Longovallius, Nova et facilis declaratio ad legem imperium ff. de iurisdictione omnium iudicium, Parisis, 1528. Longovallius' treatise was divided in four parts. The first two were devoted to a lengthy critique of the relevant Bartolist authors. The third, and rather shorter, to an exposition of the correct approach on the subject. The fourth, and longest, to its applications. Merum imperium consists of mera coerc [it] io (pt. 3, fol. 20v), whereas in mixtum imperium coercion is instrumental to the exercise of iurisdictio (ibid., fol. 21r). The difference between the two lies therefore in that the coercitio of mixtum imperium is but a means to a different end, which is iuris-dictio in its broad sense (ibid., fol. 22r). It follows that the modica coercitio of mixtum imperium is instrumental to iurisdictio, and moreover that mixtum imperium and iurisdictio form a unitary category, radically opposed to merum imperium. imperium refers exclusively to the executio of the decision. 28 Being solely concerned with executio, it does not partake in the act of rendering the judgment. For criminal offences, merum imperium commences when iurisdictio finishes.
29 By contrast, in civil proceedings merum imperium may be considered in its broader meaning of potestas iuris dicendi. The so-called lex imperium (D.2.1.3), concluded Gillotus, is clear in keeping distinct mixtum from merum imperium so long as the latter means gladii potestas animadvertendi in facinorosos homines. But when merum imperium does not have such a meaning, the execution of the decision may well be entrusted to the same magistrate that pronounced it.
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Insisting on the residual nature of merum imperium and on the strict separation of executio from cognitio, Gillotus reached a deadlock. He was able to solve it only by resorting to some acrobatic interpretations of merum imperium, which however remained hardly satisfactory. At least, in the eyes of his fellow legal humanists. An attempt to solve the impasse was made by another (and more famous) French legal humanist, Petrus Loriotus (Pierre Loriot, d. 1568 ca.). 31 Loriotus accepted Gillotus' three-fold division of cognitio, sententia and executio, 32 but sought to avoid the resulting impasse. According to Loriotus, iurisdictio had to be kept wholly detached from merum imperium (which was merely 'delictorum coercio'), in accordance with the sources. 33 On the other hand, it was imperative that the magistrate empowered with executio (and so with merum imperium) could also have cognitio, lest it appeared as a mere executioner. Logically, the only way to achieve both things was to relegate iurisdictio to the pronouncement of the sententia, and to keep it distinct from cognitio. 34 Hence, for Loriotus iurisdictio had to become only the act of pronouncing the decision, ius-dicere in the narrowest possible sense of the term. 35 This way, merum imperium and iurisdictio would remain separated, but at the same time the magistrate empowered with executio could also have cognitio of the matter. 36 Loriotus' scheme was undoubtedly ingenious, but it did not meet with much success among other legal humanists. And this not because his dilemma of cognitio, sententia and executio might resemble the famous river-crossing puzzle with a wolf, a goat, and a cabbage. Rather, because the cure of Loriotus was almost worse than the Bartolian disease. Firstly, merum imperium was once again a general potestas encompassing the whole criminal jurisdiction. 37 Secondly, Loriotus' iurisdictio was even narrower than the Bartolists' iurisdictio simplex. Once again, albeit for different reasons, it occupied 28 Ibid., pt. 1, ch. 10, n. 2, fols. 4v-5r; pt. 2, ch. 3, n. 1-2, fol. 7v, and ch. 5, fol. 8v. 29 Ibid., pt. 2, ch. 5, n. 9-10, fol. 8v. 30 Ibid., pt. 2, ch. 6, n. 6, fol. 9r-v. 31 a very marginal role -in Loriotus, the mere pronouncement of the decision. 38 Lastly, mixtum imperium (vaguely defined as 'potestas specialiter concessa, cui iurisdictio inest ') 39 was not -as we shall see -the main and nearly all-encompassing category of other humanist jurists, but it was relegated to the execution of civil decisions 40 and to non-contentious jurisdiction. 41 Although of course incorrect, it would be tempting to use the 1540s to draw a line between earlier and later legal humanist works -both on our subject and, perhaps, beyond it. None of the earlier efforts of humanist jurists to provide a coherent and systematic picture of iurisdictio and imperium was particularly successful. But they remained the main ones. It was not the difficulty of the task that discouraged later authors. Rather, it was a progressive shift in their interest. From the 1540s their work became increasingly academic and abstract, and its focus progressively more detailed and specific. Each topic underwent a scrupulous scrutiny according to its adherence to classical sources, legal and non-legal alike. Whether any single sub-topic would fit into the larger picture, it was no longer the point. The more the attention focused on the single classical sources, the less it mattered whether they could underpin abstract and general principles. The door to unbridled historical and philological speculations, already unlocked, now burst open. With specific reference to our subject, it is with the 1540s that the 'deconstruction' of medieval iurisdictio lost its character of instrumentality, a means to the end of providing accurate categories more faithful to the sources. The emphasis was progressively more on the analysis of the sources and less on general legal categories. By and large, source analysis became an end to itself. Similarly, the early contrasts among scholars such as Longovallius, Gillotus and Loriotus (each devoting a considerable part of his work to questioning that of the others, Alciatus included) now became fully-fledged academic squabbles on the (allegedly, scarce) learning of the rivals.
In the late 1540s Duarenus, Goveanus and Corasius proposed a new interpretation of iurisdictio and imperium. Franciscus Duarenus (François Douaren, 1509-1559), accepted the division between merum imperium on the one side and iurisdictio and mixtum imperium on the other, but he offered a new explanation for this, rooted on the jurisdictional prerogatives of different magistrates. 42 The praetor had only jurisdiction in private disputes, not in criminal offences. Those were entrusted to the quaestores. 45 But in turn Gouvea offered a new interpretation on the division between iurisdictio, mixtum and merum imperium based on the prerogatives of each magistrate. While it is clear that the praetor urbanus lacked merum imperium and had both mixtum imperium and iurisdictio, the praeses provinciae enjoyed all three. 46 The treatise of Ioannis Corasius (Jean de Coras, 1512-1572) followed. 47 Although he did not refer explicitly to either Duarenus or Goveanus, Corasius agreed with them on the main points, 48 especially on the division of prerogatives between praetor and quaestor. 49 The main difference with his two colleagues lay in Corasius' interpretation of mixtum imperium. To some extent, Corasius again proposed Gillotus' all-encompassing notion of mixtum imperium. Moving from the separation of prerogatives between praetor and quaestor, Corasius reasoned, Gillotus' shortcomings could be easily avoided. In any matter in which the praetor has cognitio, he also enjoys executio. Although in theory functional to the exercise of iurisdictio, 50 in Corasius' analysis mixtum imperium stretched beyond the scope of jurisdictional prerogatives. This allowed him to include in mixtum imperium also prerogatives more authoritative than strictly jurisdictional in their nature, such as in integrum restituere.
51
In between the publication of these treatises, Eguinarius Baro (François Eguinaire, Baron du Kerlouan, 1495-1550) sent to the press two works on the same subject, triggering one of the harshest disputes among legal humanists. Baro's theory resembled those of other humanist jurists only in the summa divisio between iurisdictio and mixtum imperium on the one hand and imperium merum on the other. 52 Beyond that, it was sui generis. He used the lack of iurisdictio so characteristic of merum imperium to extend its scope -at the expenses of mixtum imperium. Thus, for Baro merum imperium does not consist solely in animadversio. Rather, what lacks iurisdictio is to be considered as merum imperium, and not as mixtum. 53 Further, and moreover, he argued for a two-fold notion of iurisdictio. In its narrower sense, iurisdictio describes the prerogatives of the iudices pedanei (whereas the powers of the praetor are grouped together in mixtum imperium). 54 In its broader meaning, much to the contrary, iurisdictio represents the entire jurisdictional power. It follows that, in this second and general sense, iurisdictio is the genus encompassing also mixtum imperium. 55 In this broader meaning, iurisdictio resembles more a general power than the limited task of settling a dispute. Looking back at the three-fold division between cognitio, sententia and executio, Baro argued that iurisdictio encompasses both sententia and executio, but not really cognitio -that is up to the delegated judge. 56 At this juncture, it is hard to see any substantive difference with the old Bartolian 'tree of jurisdiction'. Indeed, in his apostasy, Baro arrived to speak the unspeakable: as a matter of fact, Bartolus was quite right, though he should have left out merum imperium.
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The answer of Duarenus and Goveanus came at once. 58 What is interesting for our purposes is that both replies went even deeper in their textual analysis than the original treatises, studiously avoiding any general overview. For it was precisely when an author sought to draw general conclusions that his argument detached from the Roman textsand so it became most vulnerable. Although he wrote his treatise while the controversy between Baro, Duarenus and Goveanus was at its apex, 59 Ludovicus Charondas (Louis Le Caron, 1534-1613) was careful not to take sides -at least openly. Probably, because he did not entirely agree with either of them. As usual, he argued that iurisdictio and merum imperium should be kept separate, 60 and that iurisdictio formed a unitary category with mixtum imperium. 61 However, unlike Baro, he did not qualify mixtum imperium as a species of the genus iurisdictio, 62 and unlike Duarenus and Goveanus he ascribed merum imperium to the dictator -not to the praeses. 63 The last point was particularly important: no magistrate holding merum imperium (that is, coercive powers) may also have iurisdictio. 64 Opting for the dictator instead of the praeses had its advantages. Ironically, Baro affirmed openly what both Duarenus and Goveanus had prudently left unsaid. So long as we focus on the praetor urbanus, then the distinction between iurisdictio and merum imperium holds. But if we look at the praeses provinciae, it is clear that he enjoys both. 65 Systematic expositions and strict adherence to the Roman sources have always proved to be poor bedfellows. Baro was attacked for his Bartolian deviations as much as for his efforts to systematise the unsystematisable. 66 Charondas simply avoided any generalisation, and so escaped much criticism.
Systematisation was dangerous and open to fierce attacks, and increasingly fewer humanist jurists ventured into general categories. But when they did, they moved carefully around the debris of previous intellectual wars. Although somewhat later than the group of legal humanist so far considered, Hugo Donellus (Hugues Doneau, 1527-1591) provides an excellent example of this, and of how attempts at laying out a general structure to our subject were not completely abandoned by authors lato sensu 59 Ludovicus Charondas, Charondae Iurisconsulti Parisiensis ... de iurisdictione et imperio libellus, Parisiis, apud Ioannem Foucherium, 1553. 60 Charondas accepted wholeheartedly the main tenets of Alciatus' reading and brought them to their ultimate consequences. The starting point was the summa divisio between merum imperium and iurisdictio (Charondas, de iurisdictione et imperio libellius, cit., n. 3-4, fols. 47v-48v). As merum imperium is exclusively concerned with animadversio, it may not take part in iurisdictio. By contrast, and simply enough, iurisdictio is 'licentia iuris dicundi' (ibid., n. 5, fol. 48v). Iurisdictio therefore stretches from the hearing of the controversy to its adjudication (ibid., n. 8, fol. 51r). It follows that there is no need to neatly separate cognitio from sententia, for iurisdictio and mixtum imperium form a unitary and indivisible category (ibid., n. 3-4, fols. 47v-48v). Even more, mixtum imperium is somewhat instrumental to ius dicere (ibid., n. 20, fol. 59r). The old adage that 'iurisdictio sine modica coercitione nulla est' does not imply the subordination of iurisdictio to imperium. Rather, it strengthens the indivisibility of iurisdictio and mixtum imperium (ibid., n. 20, fols. 58r-59r). Also, the same principle further separates them from merum imperium: the kind of coercion which merum imperium requires is structurally different from the 'modica coercitio' of mixtum imperium. Missio in possessionem and gladii potestas perfectly represent such a difference (ibid., n. 22, fol. 60r). 61 Ibid., n. 15, fols. 55v-56r. 62 Rather -although never openly -Charondas argued for the very opposite. He was particularly adamant in that mixtum imperium was not just the modica coercitio instrumental to the exercise of iurisdictio, but the sum of the standard jurisdictional prerogatives: ibid., n. 17, fol. 56v and esp. n. 19-20, fols. 57v-59r. While formally distantiating himself from Baro (e.g. ibid., n. 4, fol. 48r-v), substantially Charondas reached similar conclusions. Just, for Charondas the general category was mixtum imperium and not, as in Baro, iurisdictio. But Charondas was prudent enough not to state as much openly. 63 Ibid., n. 14, fol. 54r-v. 64 Ibid., n. 15, fol. 55r-v. 65 Baro, Ad digesta iuris civilis l. de iurisdictione, cit., p. 41. 66 Even with regard to the prerogatives of the praetor, which in theory encompassed all mixtum imperium, Baro had to make an exception for fideicommissa, which belonged exclusively to the consul. Baro, Ad τα πρώτα Digestorum, cit., tit. 1, ad l. 11 [D 2.1.11], fol. 69v. considered as legal humanists. 67 Unlike Baro, Donellus' work did not receive harsh critiques. And not just as his comment on imperium and iurisdictio was published posthumously. 68 But because Donellus looked exclusively at their application in Roman history -especially the Classical period. Nonetheless, it is easy to detect interesting parallels in between Donellus and some of the humanist jurists so far mentioned. After the usual definition of merum imperium 69 and the statements on the indivisibility of iurisdictio and mixtum imperium, 70 Donellus argued that, by and large, any form of imperium is executio. 71 If iurisdictio could not be divided from mixtum imperium, and mixtum imperium is ultimately executio, it follows that the magistrate with iurisdictio (the praetor first of all) has both cognitio and executio. 72 Further, while iurisdictio and mixtum imperium may not be separated, the ancillary function of the latter makes iurisdictio as the principal category among the two. 73 The dichotomy, observed Donellus, is between iurisdictio and merum imperium. But their structural difference does not necessarily entail their incompatibility: the same magistrate may well have both, 74 as -he argued -it is the case of the praetor.
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Later humanist jurists did not add much to the debate, which progressively became a highly specialised historical disquisition on magistrates in ancient Rome. Before this happened, however, the main features of the legal humanistic interpretation of jurisdiction were already neatly defined, and they might be summed up in broad terms. Merum imperium was utterly marginalised, largely to the benefit of mixtum imperium. The same mixtum imperium was increasingly considered as inseparable from iurisdictio, for without some degree of coercion ius dicere non potest. The distinction between private and public utility was largely rejected, 76 as well as that between iudex nobilis and mercenarius. 77 As such, the hierarchy among the three components of the 67 Donellus is a fine example of the plurality of distinct scholarships grouped together under the mos gallicus umbrella. Donellus' work was probably the first great systematic re-arrangement of all Civil law. In order to include him among legal humanists, it was necessary to add systematisation to the main aims of humanist jurists. As it happens, few things are more remote from legal humanism than systematisation. 68 76 Even those jurists, such as Donellus, who retained it did so within an entirely different framework from the traditional ius commune one: ibid, ch. 7, n. 5, col. 1101. 77 While rejecting it in principle, this division often resurfaced among legal humanists, chiefly because of the temptation to identify the iudex nobilis with the praetor, and the mercenarius with the iudex pedaneus. But this simply added fuel to the scholarly debate, for it triggered endless disputes on whether the iurisdictio of the praetor had to be narrowed down to the simple datio iudicis, or whether the praetor Accursian notion of iurisdictio was turned entirely upside-down. Mixtum imperium, inextricably linked to iurisdictio, was now the most important of the three categories, encompassing the vast majority of jurisdictional functions. Beyond this, each legal humanist had different ideas on both definition and scope of the three categories, especially iurisdictio and mixtum imperium. 'Pure' iurisdictio was especially tantalising, as well as the issue of which specific prerogatives should fall into mixtum imperium, and why.
iv. In the Euripidean tragedy, the gods had the good sense of intervening one at time. Legal humanism suffered from an overpopulated Olympus. All of a sudden, lawyers were faced with a number of different and mutually-contradicting theories, all of which could however claim stronger links with the Roman sources than the traditional ius commune one. Whatever the defects of the tradition, the avalanche of new theories had a deeply destabilising effect. In a few decades, the entire subject of iurisdictio became extremely confusing. In the words of Ioannis Bologneti (Giovanni Bolognetti, 1506-1575), 'such a variety of opinions created a huge confusion in the meaning of the law'.
78
Similar comments became so frequent that it would be pointless (and probably impossible) to list them in full.
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The later ius commune production is typically considered as exceedingly practicalminded and hardly interested in general and theoretical discussions. This is true to some extent. For even the most pragmatically-oriented (or plainly casuistic) lawyers clearly relied on the Bartolian scheme. To give an extreme example, in the 252 pages of his consilia devoted to iurisdictio, the famed jurist De Luca never once discussed the Bartolian categories. But he always presupposed them. within the Accursian gloss, never against it. Now, for the first time, it became vital to defend the very grounds on which the entire jurisdictional framework was built. From the second half of the sixteenth century, when a work touched upon the subject of jurisdiction only in passim it usually adhered to the Bartolian scheme in a few lines and quickly moved on. 82 Other times it simply avoided the whole issue. 83 But when a treatise was devoted (in full or in part) to the subject of jurisdiction, it typically looked at the Bartolian scheme with a significant (humanistic) attention to the sources, in order to defend it. 48; Jacob Brinkmann, Dissertatio ad vexatissimam l. de iurisdictione, Jenae, typis Viduae Weidnerianae, 1631, thesis 1, n. 2-4, 6-7, 9-10, 16, 25-32. Special mention should also be made of the number of lexica iuridica printed between the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth century -often the most A particularly vehement apology of the Bartolian categories was that of Hieronymus Muscornius (Hieronimo Muscornio). Muscornius allowed only for minor corrections to the traditional interpretation of the lex imperium, 85 which he shielded with many 'counter-quotations' from classical sources, 86 as well as with some new interpretations of Latin terms. In particular, he stressed that the verb 'animadvertere' is a neuter term, since it just means 'vertere animum, atque mentem'. 87 As such, it may not be used in a narrow sense. The animadversio in facinorosos homines of Ulpian in D.2.1.3, therefore, does not mean that merum imperium is confined to the execution of criminal punishments. Rather, and precisely after Bartolus, for Muscornius merum imperium is suprema potestas. 88 Muscornius' somewhat drastic attempt was a relatively isolated case. Especially on merum imperium, most jurists tended to agree with legal humanists. 'Merum' meant 'purum', not 'summum', and as such it had to be relegated to criminal disputes. 89 Complete repudiation of legal humanist critiques did not prove successful: some compromises had to be made. Significantly enough, narrowing merum imperium to criminal proceedings was the main concession to legal humanism that a jurist as important and representative of the later ius commune as Iacobus Menochius (Jacopo Menochio, 1532-1607) could allow. Menochius stated as much at the very beginning of his treatise on iurisdictio. 90 Apart from that, however, he fully adhered to the traditional Bartolian scheme, 91 stressing in particular the concept of imperium as a unitary category. 92 No matter how Haloander's edition of the Digest would read, for Menochius iurisdictio clearly came from iuris-ditio, as attested in a number of classical sources, ranging from Cicero to Virgil. 93 Menochius' use of classical texts is revealing of an extremely widespread attitude. On a superficial level, it betrays the effort of many lawyers to pay back legal humanists' attacks in kind. 94 More deeply, however, it attests to the growing interest for a meticulous examination of the sources also among Bartolists (who otherwise would have not felt the need to answer to the humanist jurists' critiques in the first place). If a word or a concept was attested in classical sources, legal and extra-legal alike, it gave weight to the legal argument. Even a Bartolist as orthodox as Muscornius insisted on the importance of interpreting Latin terms according to the sources, not to their modern usage. 95 Thus, behind the courtain of endless debates on the exact meaning of legal terms in the classical sources, there lay practical consequences -not philological appetites.
96 By the eve of the seventeenth century no systematic treatise dealing with jurisdictional issues could avoid long digressions into historical and philological discussions. Unfaithfulness to Roman sources became progressively a clear sign of being plainly wrong. As a consequence, many jurists paid increasing attention to the exact terminology used in Roman sources. Yet, attention to the sources always remained a means, not an end. The end was more practical: grounding current legal issues into ius commune categories -and solving them accordingly.
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Apart from Menochius and Muscornius, the most important (and quoted) among the treatises seeking to conciliate Bartolism with the main critiques of legal humanism opted for very elaborated schemes. While apparently detaching themselves from the Bartolian orthodoxy, such treatises ultimately aimed at protecting the traditional jurisdictional framework. Among them, mention should be made of at least three: those of Bologneti, Obrecht and Bocerus. Bologneti divided iurisdictio and imperium in three different categories (legislative, jurisdictional and equitable), 98 according to their object. 99 Then, he divided the jurisdictional category into actio and persecutio, actio corresponding to (jurisdicitonal) iurisdictio, and persecutio to (jurisdictional) imperium. In turn, and lastly, (jurisdictional) persecutio was segmented into criminalis and civilis after the divide category (i.e that of iuris-ditio). Simon Sichardus, Lexicon iuridicum, Coloniae Agrippinae, apud haeredes Iohannis Gymnici, 1600, § imperium, p. 437. 95 'Verba quando latine concipiunctur esse semper interpretanda secundum latinos, et non vulgares homines'. Muscornius, Tractatus de Iurisdictione atque imperio, cit., n. 22, p. 11. Muscornius' insistence on the correct interpretation of the sources derived from his view of legal humanism as a degeneration of philology applied to the law. In his view, the fallacy of humanist jurists lay in their exasperate attention to the abstract meaning of a word, extrapolated from its broader -and legal -context. 96 For example, one of such debates focused on the exact meaning of the key-word 'animadvertere'. In order to prove that merum imperium consisted of both cognitio and executio, Bologneti divided the phrase 'animadver[sio] in facinorosos homines' of D.2.1.3 in two parts. Animadversio stood for cognitio, whereas its application 'in facinorosos homines' represented the executio. Bologneti, In primam Digesti veteris repetitiones, cit., ad D.2.1.3, n. 26, fol. 190r. In order to achieve the same result with somewhat sounder arguments, Bocerus looked at many classical sources, and concluded that animadversio was used both in the sense of cognoscere and coercere. Henricus Bocerus, Disputatio de iurisdictione, Tubingae, typis Georgij Gruppenbachij, 1597, n. 14, let. a-c, p. 15. Such a conclusion was harshly criticised by Hunnius, De iurisdictione tractatus, cit., pt. 1, ch. 1, q. 3, n. 3, p. 31-32, who pointed that in legal Roman sources (as opposed to extra-legal ones) its meaning was only that of coercere. 97 99 Ibid., n. 4-6, and n. 10, fols. 187v-188r.
V. I have said earlier that many non-humanists considered historical and philological debates as important digressions which however were not the ultimate aim of their work. This seems to imply that 'proper' humanist jurists on the contrary regarded history and philology as an end to itself. Doubltess, some of them did. But the historian should always look with suspicion at 'purely' cultural struggles. The lex imperium was the cornerstone of the ius commune notion of authority. Deconstructing it, legal humanists attacked the legal foundations of centralised power. Just ten years after Alciatus' Paradoxa, the ultimate two consequences of the new approach were clearly outlined by Longovallius, and then shared by most humanist jurists. First and foremost, imperium (be it merum or mixtum) was hardly the province of political authority. It pertained exclusively to the judge.
111 Merum imperium was extremely narrow, just mera coercio, and its scope was limited to the execution of criminal judgments. 112 The power to legislate (the highest example of merum imperium for the Bartolists) therefore could not be grounded on merum imperium. 113 Mixtum imperium and iurisdictio on the other hand were to be interpreted with exclusive regard to the jurisdictional sphere. It followed that the prerogatives ascribed to mixtum imperium or iurisdictio did not compete to political authorities (first of all the prince), but only to the judges. 114 Secondly, and to our purposes even more importantly, the new approach had profound repercussions on delegated jurisdiction. The Digest was quite clear in that jurisdictional prerogatives pertaining to private controversies could be delegated, whereas any prerogative especially conferred by the law could not. 115 As such, it was not possible to delegate merum imperium, whereas mixtum imperium (since iurisdictio coaeherens) could be freely delegated. 116 At this point the insistence of most legal humanists on mixtum imperium as an all-encompassing category and on the marginality of merum imperium may be fully appreciated. The Accursian Gloss interpreted the Roman text as allowing to delegate only iurisdictio (simplex) and what parts of mixtum imperium were instrumental to its exercise. 117 Bartolus' systematisation added weight to this, for an obvious corollary of the basic distinction between iudex nobilis and mercenarius was that no prerogative belonging to the nobilis could be entrusted to the latter. 118 The
At first sight, the whole debate might appear hardly relevant to contemporary issues. But if we look slightly beyond the Roman facade, the message was pretty clear. As openly stated by Baro with his usual bluntness, if iurisdictio is basse justice, mixtum imperium is moyenne justice and merum imperium is haute justice, it follows that local judges (magistratus municipales) enjoy not only basse, but also (and moreover) moyenne justice. 124 But in the sixteenth century none of the three categories corresponded perfectly to its Roman equivalent. In particular, haute justice was not coterminous with merum imperium but it was somewhat broader, encompassing also some prerogatives of Roman mixtum imperium. If local magistrates enjoyed mixtum imperium in full, then they would also have some prerogatives pertaining to haute justice.
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If we look back at the main (and most quoted) defences of the Bartolian jurisdictional categories in the light of such observations, those apparently abstract (and abstruse) discussions might look quite different. Menochius' insistence on the unity of imperium, which could be considered both as species and genus, 126 was aimed at detaching mixtum imperium from iurisdictio. The more mixtum imperium was considered under the genus of imperium, the less it would have in common with iurisdictio. Far from being a dogmatic digression, Menochius' theory had serious repercussions on the scope of delegated iurisdictio. Being two different categories, mixtum imperium was not merely instrumental to the exercise of iurisdictio. When iurisdictio was delegated, therefore, only a few prerogatives pertaining to mixtum imperium could accompany it. 127 While studiously avoiding to state as much too openly, Menochius considerably narrowed the powers of the delegated judge in practice. 128 Similarly, Bologneti's division between actio and persecutio allowed to distinguish fully mixtum imperium from iurisdictio. . And yet he is conspicuously silent on the most debated issue, namely whether mixtum imperium may be delegated and, if so, whether it should automatically follow iurisdictio delegata (ibid., esp. ch. 13-15, p. 214-221, the obvious sedes materiae for such a discussion). The omission is all the more remarkable for two reasons. First, because Menochius was the only author dealing extensively with the subject to avoid the issue. Second, given that the omission itself was just partial, for immediately before he had clearly excluded the delegation of merum imperium (ibid., ch. 12 [q. 12], n. 1, p. 213-214), therefore begging the issue when it came to mixtum imperium, an omission so remarkable to appear voluntary, all the more given his insistence on the unitary nature of imperium. 129 It followed that mixtum imperium was not (to borrow a theological term) 'consubstantial' with iurisdictio: their substantia was different, both on a procedural level and on a theoretical one. As such, and crucially, mixtum imperium did not follow iurisdictio, and when iurisdictio was delegated mixtum imperium was not. 130 Ultimately, Bologneti's three-fold division of both iurisdictio and imperium (legislative, jurisdictional and equitable) was aimed at structurally preventing any issue on delegation, for the very power to delegate (potestas delegandi) did not pertain to judicial iurisdictio (iurisdictio iudiciaria), but rather to equitable iurisdictio (iurisdictio gratiosa). 131 Delegating iurisdictio was therefore a matter way beyond the reach of ordinary judges.
132 By the same token, the apparently specious classifications of Obrecht -opposing the notio of iurisdictio to the potestas of imperium, stressing the unity of imperium and dividing the prerogatives of mixtum imperium according to their instrumentality to the exercise of iurisdictio -were in fact aimed at detaching mixtum imperium from iurisdictio, so to narrow as much as possible the prerogatives pertaining to mixtum imperium which could be delegated together with iurisdictio.
133 Even Bocerus' division between iurisdictio ordinaria and specialis (or extraordinaria) allowed him to keep the vast majority of prerogatives pertaining to mixtum imperium away from iurisdictio, and therefore to prevent their delegability. 134 In short, far from being convoluted byzantinisms, such re-classifications of the Bartolian scheme were in fact a set of counter-measures to avoid the institutional devolution of mixtum imperium to lower judges.
Even if we were to conclude, as any sensible scholar is apparently expected to, that legal humanism was a renaissance of legal culture, selflessly aiming to restore the purity of Roman law for its own sake, some doubts might still linger. Here, we have briefly glimpsed two in particular. Firstly, the effect of those learned observations was consistenti. ' 130 Ibid., n. 16, fols. 188v-189r; cf. also n. 91, fol. 204r. 131 Ibid., n. 32, fol. 191r. 132 Ibid., n. 43-44, fols. 193v-194v. Cf. also n. 85, fol. 202r. To be safe, Bologneti used the division between actio and persecutio to prevent the other possible way to broaden the scope of the jurisdiction of lower judges: the appeal. On the subject, the common understanding was that the competence to hear appellate cases depended on the subject matter. As the court of appeal would hear the same controversy discussed before that of first instance, it did not need broader competences. So, if the subject matter fell within the scope of iurisdictio, then (at least in principle) the appellate judge did not need imperium. To prevent a delegated judge from being entrusted with the appeal, Bologneti looked at the act of appealing (admissio appellationis) and considered it to be beyond the scope of actio (i.e. iurisdictio) and so within that of persecutio (typically, civilis), hence requiring mixtum imperium. Since lower judges neither had mixtum imperium nor could receive it (by delegation), it followed that they could not hear any appeal either. Ibid., esp. n. 101, fol. 206r. 133 Obrecht, Disputatio de Iurisdictionis et Imperii Principiis, cit., theses 227 and 370. Further, the distinction between notio and potestas allowed Obrecht to insist on the instrumentality of iurisdictio to imperium mixtum and not vice-versa, as most legal humanists held: ibid., thesis 322. 134 Bocerus, Disputatio de iurisdictione, cit., n. 3 let. b, p. 3, and n. 5, let. a-b, p. 4. Once excluded the delegability of the largest part of mixtum imperium, Bocerus happily agreed with legal humanists on the instrumentality of coercitio to iurisdictio and its delegability, in a crescendo of lip-service (ibid., esp. n. 10, let. a-b, p. 7-8, n. 12, let. a-f, p. 9-12, n. 13, let. a-g, p. 12-14). Among the (many) other authors who did substantially as much see e.g. Borrello, De Magistratuum edictis, cit., lib. 1, ch. 1, n. 114, p. 26-27, and Vulteius, Commentarius at tit. Codicis, cit., ad C.3.13, n. 84, p. 50, n. 91, p. 52.
potentially of momentous impact. For their target was a stratified system build on the Accursian Gloss and its Bartolian interpretation, a centuries-old system ultimately still stemming from the very trunk which the humanist jurists were trying so industriously to fell. Secondly, and more specifically, many attacks of legal humanists often had a centrifugal purpose, for they targeted the judicial structure of centralised power. Even so, all this remains speculation. It is of course possible that all the above debate was a genuine protest led by erudite and accomplished scholars against the great liberties the Bartolists had taken in respect to the Roman texts. And that Civilians were just indulging in tedious, useless and abstract speculations -their speciality, after all. Divesting imperium of any legislative and authoritiative meaning might appear a harsh attack on a political level, but it may well be a coincidence that the same arguments were pushed to their extreme consequences shortly thereafter by those legal humanists often known as Monarchomacs. Similarly, the fact that the largest portion of nearly all humanistic treatises on our subject focused on delegated jurisdiction and implied the effective freedom of lower tribunals from Royal courts could just be an over-analysis. After all, no Kulturkampf has ever had political ends.
